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The dramatic surge in the formation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 1 in recent years has been noted widely, both in the press and in academic scholarship, and has produced a substantial literature on the causes and effects of these agreements. Much of the scholarship on PTAs has focused on their implications for the multilateral trading system, and, more specifically, on the question of whether they constitute "building blocks or stumbling blocks" to the forward momentum of trade liberalization. 2 Far less attention has been paid to the actual provisions of these agreements. Existing work has treated PTAs as homogenous in their content and by implication in their effects on trade, ignoring the fact that the provisions of these agreements vary widely.
In this paper, we seek to redress this gap in the literature and to address one of the motivating issues for this project on 'Judicial Politics in International Trade Relations": does the variation in judicialization we observe in trade agreements actually have an impact on postagreement trade flows between agreement partners? (De Bièvre and Poletti, this volume) . Given that the majority of agreements in the global network of PTAs contains some form of dispute settlement, and that these dispute settlement mechanisms invariably also generate binding resolutions (Allee and Elsig 2014) , this paper investigates whether such judicialization produces strong positive effects on trade flows. That is, we focus on the economic consequences of 4 judicialization, as observed through changes in trade flows following the signing and ratification of a trade agreement.
We examine the economic effects of enforcement mechanisms in PTAs by contrasting them with two other key dimensions of PTA design: the level of trade policy discretion provided in the PTA's provisions and its flexibility mechanisms. We premise our analytical framework on the argument that strong positive effects on trade flows are the result of an agreement that is also strong on credible commitment, as international institutions such as trade agreements resolve the time-inconsistency problem of trade policy by tying the hands of its signatories. This credible commitment, we argue, is reflected in a combination of three institutional components: i) trade policy Discretion, or the degree to which an agreement removes trade policy from the hands of the government; and ii) Enforcement, or the costs of defecting from the agreement, i.e., the level of judicialization, namely the strength of its enforcement mechanisms. At the same time, countries will not necessarily benefit from tying their hands as tightly as possible: iii) Flexibility mechanisms should not only make designing trade agreements easier and lower contracting costs, it should also have a more beneficial effect on trade. By allowing politicians room to respond to exogenous shocks, having more flexible mechanisms may ensure that the PTA continues to develop and does not become a zombie (Gray 2012) .
To capture these dimensions in PTA provisions, we apply an original coding scheme to 57 Asian PTAs that have been signed or were in force by 2006. We employ confirmatory factor analysis and find empirical support for the hypothesized relationship between the constructs we develop--Discretion, Enforcement, and Flexibility-and the specific PTA provisions that we 5 identify as their respective component measures. For the main empirical analysis, we employ a standard gravity model of international trade with year and dyadic fixed effects to evaluate the impact of trade agreements on trade flows, with the former measured both as a dichotomous variable and with our measures based on PTA provisions. We find that the dichotomous measure of PTAs does not have a significant effect on trade, but that our more specific measures do.
Removing trade policy discretion from a government, and in some cases flexibility mechanisms, have a stronger positive effect on trade flows than do enforcement mechanisms.
Credible Commitment and the Politics and Economics of PTAs
The scholarship on PTAs has addressed a wide range of questions, beginning with the trade-creation effects of PTAs and ultimately their implications as "building blocks or stumbling blocks" or as "friends" or "foes" for the multilateral system (Viner 1950 , Bhagwati 1991 , 1994 Baldwin 1995; Levy 1997; Bagwell and Staiger 1998; Panagariya 2000; Pomfret [1997] 2001; Aghion, Antras and Helpman 2004; Limao 2006a Limao , 2006b and Baier and Bergstrand 2007.) . Studies have examined closely the conditions under which PTAs are likely to be tradediverting, resulting in welfare losses for those outside the agreement and thus a "foe" to the pursuit of multilateral trade liberalization (Grossman and Helpman 1995; Krishna 1998) . Going beyond the theoretical literature, empirical studies of PTAs have found a correlation between PTAs and unilateral trade liberalization (Foroutan 1998; Panagariya 1999; Bohara, Gawande, and Sanguinetti 2004) . Interestingly, the relationship between PTAs and trade flows is somewhat mixed. Early studies found that PTAs did not increase trade between members. These studies did not account for the endogeneity of PTAs that may explain their findings (Baier and Bergstrand 2007) . More recent studies, which include dyadic fixed effects to control for endogenous PTA 6 formation, find that PTAs have a strong trade-creating effect among members (Rose 2004; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007) .
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Constraints on Trade Policy Discretion
A standard view of international agreements such as PTAs is that a government uses them to tie its hands with respect to trade policy (Simmons 2000; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Rosendorff 2005; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Büthe and Milner 2008.) . Building on the timeinconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott 1977) , or the insight that if the government has discretion over policy, it has an incentive to renege on its ex ante policy promise and enact a different policy ex post, in signing a PTA a government gives up control over trade policy and commits itself to trade liberalization. Agreeing to a PTA sends a signal--if a government violates the agreement, it suffers reputational costs (Simmons 2000, 819) . 4 A government can relinquish some control over trade policy by joining a multilateral organization such as the GATT/WTO or by signing a free trade agreement which delegates authority to adjudicate to the institution and also limits the ability to increase tariffs, allowing it to resist pressure from protectionist groups (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998 , Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2007 , Bagwell and Staiger 1999 , and Staiger and Tabellini 1999 . A government can point to the trade agreement as the reason why greater protection cannot be granted. The insights have been applied to link PTAs with issue areas other than trade as well. Büthe and Milner (2008) argue that PTAs increase FDI in developing countries because their visibility makes reneging on them more costly. Investors are, therefore, more confident that governments will maintain liberal economic policies.
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Nevertheless, this literature treats all trade agreements as the same, as if they "leave no discretion to governments" Rodriguez-Clare 2007, 1375) .
Enforcement Mechanisms
However, simply signing an international agreement or delegating policy is not sufficient for a government to tie its hands; there have to be mechanisms in place to deter and to punish cheating on the agreement. Without some way to tell if a government is cheating on the agreement, the public will not believe that the government is not interfering in policy. The presence of these enforcement mechanisms, that is the mechanisms of judicialization in trade agreements, lends credibility to a commitment. North and Weingast define a credible commitment as how constrained a government is "to obey a set of rules that do not permit leeway for violating commitments" (1989, 804) . The literature on PTAs largely treats trade agreements as perfectly enforceable, even while recognizing that differences in enforceability exist across agreements in the real world (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2007).
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Studies on enforcement mechanisms in PTAs have focused on their design rather than their effects. James McCall Smith (2000) attributes the adoption of more strict or legalistic dispute settlement mechanisms to a combination of low asymmetries in economic power and an agreement's depth of integration. 6 Pevehouse and Buhr (2005) argue that democracies are more 5 Conconi and Perroni 2009 explicitly consider self-enforcing agreements. 6 Smith uses legalism to refer to the objectivity of a dispute settlement clause. Disputes that are decided by a third party are more legalistic because they remove decision-making capacity from the disputing countries while disputes settled by consultations between the parties are less 8 willing to concede autonomy in their international affairs and are motivated by the possible economic benefits of the trade agreement, both of which lead them to agree to a high level of legalism in trade agreements.
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Flexibility
Yet another body of literature examines the trade-off between flexibility and credibility in the design of enforcement mechanisms (Smith 2000; Rosendorff and Milner 2001; Rosendorff 2005 Similarly, institutional mechanisms such as the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) allow temporary "defections" from obligations that render a more stable institution (Rosendorff 2005) . These arguments suggest that agreements will ensure greater compliance if legalistic because they allow a stronger role for the parties in the dispute. In this paper, we also refer to more legalistic clauses as strong or stringent.
governments are permitted to invoke escape clauses in order to alleviate pressures from domestic constituents, so long as there is still some cost in using these mechanisms. There has been no attempt, however, to examine whether differences in enforcement mechanisms have consequences for trade flows among agreement partners.
This paper engages with the recent scholarship on trade agreements that has started to focus on variability in PTA design and its effects. Büthe and Milner (2011) Hypothesis 1: Agreements that leave governments less trade policy discretion should increase trade more than those that leave the government more policy discretion.
Our second hypothesis concerns the theme of this volume: the level of judicialization as captured by the mechanisms created to monitor and punish defections from the agreement. If the public cannot determine whether a government is abiding by the terms of the agreement, the government's commitment will be less credible and we would not expect a large increase in trade. We would expect that agreements with stronger dispute settlement and agreements that impose more objective costs will have a stronger effect one trade.
Hypothesis 2: Agreements with stronger enforcement mechanisms should have a stronger positive effect on trade than those with weaker enforcement mechanisms.
At the same time, a government may want some room to be able to temporarily defect from the agreement without ending the agreement. By designing flexibility into the agreement, a government can respond to exogenous shocks and violate the agreement as long as it agrees to pay some costs of defection (Rosendorff 2005) . While this flexibility may decrease overall 8 An alternative argument suggests that governments are not trying to change their behavior when they sign international agreements. Instead, governments self-select into agreements and sign only the agreements that they want to sign. A government's behavior under the agreement is not very different from what it would do in the absence of the agreement. The amount of trade policy discretion given up is an institutionalization of a government's preferences rather than an attempt to commit itself to a specific policy. 9 We are not the first to recognize the potentially symbolic nature of commitments in RTAs.
Smith writes "Where liberalization commitments are narrow in scope or vague and distant in time, the basic trade-off [between discretion and compliance] is inoperative, since domestic political leaders have little to risk and little to gain" (2000, p. 151).
credibility, it should contribute to greater compliance with and stability of the agreement. Here, we argue that these positive benefits also have a larger and positive effect on trade between agreement partners. Importers and exporters will be more likely to believe that a government will stick with an agreement if it has some room for maneuver. If the agreement is not flexible enough, traders may believe that in difficult economic circumstances a government may back out of the agreement. Alternatively, traders may believe that a government will simply ignore the agreement. In either case, trade will not increase by much as it would with flexible provisions.
Thus, our third hypothesis is about flexibility mechanisms:
Hypothesis 3: Agreements that allow more flexibility in invoking trade remedies should have a stronger positive effect on trade than those with more stringent trade remedies.
In the empirical analysis, we also consider the contingent effects of discretion and both enforcement and flexibility mechanisms. That is, we would expect that the joint presence of discretion and strong enforcement mechanisms to have a positive effect on trade flows: In the empirical analysis, we account for this contingent effect by interacting two dichotomous variables: one for PTAs above the mean for discretion and one for PTAs above the mean for enforcement.
Coding PTAs
Similar to the central bank independence literature, which quantifies the level of central bank independence by examining the texts of central bank laws (Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1994) , we examine the legal provisions of the PTA to distinguish how much they tie a government's hands (discretion), their enforcement mechanisms, and their flexibility mechanisms. bounded between 0 and 1, rather than dichotomously, and higher scores should be associated with a larger increase in trade. Because we are interested in an agreement's effect on trade, our components focus on the coverage of trade in goods. We recognize that PTAs now often include many more issue areas and that our coding does not completely cover the contents of the agreement. Nevertheless, the fact that agreements often are about more than trade in goods makes it imperative to understand whether the provisions related to trade in goods do affect trade. If some PTAs are mainly about issues other than trade in goods and some are about trade in goods, treating the two equivalently blurs an important distinction between them. Immediately below, we discuss how each component is coded and how each should increase trade.
[ Table 1 about here]
Trade Policy Discretion. To estimate the trade policy discretion an agreement leaves to a government, we construct an indicator with six components that measure how much an agreement removes a government's control over trade policy. In effect, we conceptualize discretion as the surrendering of trade policy discretion, rather than the retaining of such discretion, in the core areas as covered in this category. The first component is the type of PTA or the depth of the agreement. The closer the economic ties a PTA creates, the greater the effect on trade, all else equal. Thus we expect that PTAs that provide for the formation of economic unions will contribute more toward expanded trade flows than other types of PTAs. However, even an agreement that calls itself a free trade agreement may not remove tariffs on all barriers.
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The remaining components in the discretion category, therefore, include the type of products covered by the agreement, such as the overall coverage of industrial and agricultural products, and whether other trade restrictions such as technical barriers to trade and non-tariff barriers are covered. A trade agreement that allows a government to maintain other types of trade restrictions such as non-tariff barriers or technical barriers to trade leaves a government more trade policy discretion and should have less of an effect on trade than one that removes these types of restrictions. Governments can simply change the trade restrictions from tariffs to non-tariff barriers. Also, an agreement that covers both agricultural and industrial products will restrict the actions of a government more than one that excludes either of these sectors. By including tariff reductions on politically sensitive areas such as agriculture in the agreement, a government can more easily resist future protectionist pressures from this sector.
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Enforcement. As discussed above, trade policy involves a time inconsistency problem that must be overcome. An agreement that lowers trade restrictions will do nothing to tie the hands of the government without provisions to deter defections from the agreement. Our second category-enforcement-includes four components that focus on how defections from the agreement are settled. 10 The rationale for the coding of the reciprocal component is that an agreement that has different timetables for participant countries may not be as credible as those that require the same timetables. Because this paper analyzes reciprocal PTAs, none of the PTAs coded receive a score of 0 on this measure. There are differences in the timing of the tariff cuts that we felt were important, but are restricted to a couple of cases. First, many multilateral PTAs have different schedules for the lesser and more developed countries, so those were coded as .5. Also, Singapore basically has no tariff rates, so in its agreements it tends to eliminate all of its tariffs upon entry into force while allowing the partner country more latitude (with a couple of exceptions). These were also coded as .5.
First, more formal dispute settlement procedures should have a stronger effect on trade than agreements with no dispute settlement mechanisms or with informal mechanisms. The final three components in the Enforcement category measure the costs a government pays for violating the agreement. In order to be effective, enforcement mechanisms should impose some cost to invoke them. If there is no cost to using the mechanisms, there is nothing to prevent a government from using them whenever it wants and we would expect the agreement to have no effect on trade. A government pays a higher cost the more binding is a dispute settlement resolution. If the government can ignore a resolution, then there is little cost imposed on the government for agreement violations. Similarly, leaving the determination of compensation to formal arbiters should impose a higher cost and represent a stronger commitment than leaving the determination of compensation to the injured party. Finally, if the agreement imposes compensation and a time limit for invoking escape clauses, there will be more costs in invoking escape clauses which should make their usage less likely.
Finally, the Flexibility category measures how easily a government can invoke antidumping and escape clauses. Our coding gives the highest scores to provisions that allow governments some leeway in using them and middle scores to provisions that strictly define their use. When member countries can consult with one another on the use of escape clauses or to identify dumping, it may be easier to justify the breaches as necessary, given existing economic conditions. We recognize that there are several options for flexibility in an agreement, defined as 
Data and Analysis
We conduct our empirical analysis on PTAs in Asia, where such agreements have seen an unprecedented and rapid rise since the mid-1990s and especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (Ravenhill 2008a (Ravenhill , 2003 . 15 They include all agreements for which texts were available.
Appendix 1, available online, lists the PTAs alphabetically, including the year in which the PTA was signed and when it went into force (if applicable).
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Descriptive statistics. In Table 2 , we present descriptive statistics of our measures of PTA provisions, based on the scores for individual PTAs. Both the discretion and the enforcement mechanism measures range from low values to high values and both are skewed towards high values. The mean discretion score is .54 while the mean enforcement score is .63. The mean flexibility score is even larger at .84. There is also a correlation between discretion and enforcement. When agreements remove more trade policy discretion, the average score for the other categories is higher. The average enforcement score for agreements with discretion scores above the mean for all agreements is .79 while the average enforcement score when discretion is below the mean is only .38. For Flexibility, the average is .91 when discretion is above the mean and .74 when discretion is below the mean. Discretion is more highly correlated with 15 http://aric.adb.org/FTAbyCountryAll.php. We can also compare PTAs of a single country: Singapore, for example, has 9 PTAs in force in our data. While the scores for enforcement and discretion are above the mean there is still some variation across PTAs. Moreover, the scores for enforcement and discretion do not move together. The New Zealand-Singapore PTA has the highest discretion score among Singapore's PTAs at 0.82 but its enforcement score is 0.78 which is the third lowest among Singapore's PTAs. Singapore has 3 PTAs with an enforcement score of 0.92 (EFTA-Singapore, Japan-Singapore, and Korea-Singapore), but the discretion scores are 0.79, 0.65, and 0.69, respectively.
We employ a measurement model, which links a theoretical construct or latent variable (also called a factor) with observed indicators. We utilize confirmatory factor analysis as we have developed a priori which of the observed indicators, that is, the specific PTA provisions, are associated with which of the three constructs as described above. 17 We test the hypothesized links between the specific PTA provisions we have identified and the latent constructs Discretion, Flexibility, and Enforcement we developed in the 'Coding PTAs' section of this paper. In testing these hypothesized links, we are essentially testing this restricted model vis-à-vis the null hypothesis of an unrestricted model in which no specific relationship is hypothesized between the latent constructs and observed measures.
Thus we analyze a measurement with three latent variables-Discretion, Enforcement,
and Flexibility, to examine the extent to which the data support empirically these theoretical constructs central to the paper. 18 The results are presented in Table 3 . For Discretion, which includes 6 components, all components have loadings that are statistically significant. In particular, the degree to which the agreement covers industrial goods, agriculture, and technical barriers to trade (TBTs) are the most important determinants of variation in the construct.
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Whether the agreement is reciprocal and includes commitments on non-tariff barriers are less important in determining the level of discretion relinquished by the agreement signatory. For 17 Exploratory data analysis, in contrast, derives the factor structure directly from the data. The analysis allows the data to determine the number of factors, or latent variables, and which observed measures are associated with them. As we have explicitly developed a theoretical framework in the early section of this paper for linking the three constructs with the PTA provisions, we employ confirmatory factor analysis to test the hypothesized links between these latent factors and their observed measures. 18 The likelihood ration (LR) test of this model versus the saturated model is statistically significant: chi2(74) = 45264.33, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000. The test is conducted for the model without robust standard errors clustered by dyad. 19 The comparison is made with the type of agreement, which is a constrained to 1 for identification purposes.
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Enforcement, which includes four components, relative to the provision of a formal dispute settlement mechanism, degree to which dispute resolution is binding, compensation relies on third party determination, and escape clause actions conform or go beyond WTO-mandated levels all show positive and statistically significant loadings. The last construct, Flexibility, appears only to be weakly related to the components specified by our conceptual framework. The covariance statistics at the bottom of Table 3 also show that these constructs are largely independent from one another, as the covariance is low (less than .01) for any given pair of latent
constructs.
Quantitative Analysis
We analyze directed-dyad data to examine whether differences in PTAs have an effect on bilateral trade between partners. All models contain both dyadic fixed effects and year fixed effects. The year fixed effects help control for any systemic shock in a given year that has a similar effect on all countries. The dyadic fixed effects also control for the endogeneity of trade agreements and trade (Baier and Bergstrand 2004) , in particular the non-random factors that drive certain pairs of countries to gravitate toward greater (or lesser) degrees of judicialization.
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Dyadic fixed effects transform the data to focus on changes from the dyad's mean value of each variable, so the coefficient on the PTA variables measures the change in trade when the agreement is in effect compared to when it is not in effect. 20 We acknowledge the importance of the endogeneity issue and its ramifications for causal inference in this analysis, and we remain mindful of the uncertainty associated with any methodological approach for this issue. Baier and Bergstrand's (2004) corrective is specifically offered to address the endogeneity issue in the formation of free trade agreements. We extend their logic and methodological corrective for the other side of the causal chain-the consequences of judicialization. and dyadic fixed effects, many of the variables common in gravity models drop out of the model.
These include land area, contiguity, number of islands in the dyad, the number of landlocked countries in the dyad, colonies and distance.
Findings
The first column of Table 4 reports baseline estimation results from including a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1 if there is a PTA in force within the dyad. There is scant evidence that enforcement mechanisms increase trade. The coefficient on the enforcement variable is not statistically significant.
Part of the argument is that the combination of discretion and enforcement should increase trade more than either one by itself. To test this, we create two dichotomous indicators.
The first is equal to 1 if the discretion score is above the mean for Asian PTAs. The second is equal to 1 if the enforcement score is greater than the mean for PTAs. We then include these two variables and their interaction in column 5. Contrary to expectations, the results suggest that discretion has a stronger impact at low levels of enforcement-the coefficient on discretion itself is positive and significant. Having both high levels of discretion and enforcement does not significantly affect trade. In column 5 we repeat the exercise with discretion and flexibility.
Flexibility with low scores on discretion is negative and significant but having high scores on both does significantly increase trade.
In the last three models of Table 4 , we repeat the exercise using the indices, or factor scores, created from our confirmatory factor analysis. 
Unpacking the Measures
In the next section, we unpack the combined measures and focus on the components individually. By looking at the components individually, we can explore whether some components of the enforcement mechanism variables affect trade more than others. The results are reported in Table 5 The first half of Table 5 includes the six individual Discretion components. Five of the six discretion measures have a positive and significant effect on trade. The exception is technical barriers to trade (TBTs), which is negative and fails to reach statistical significance. The highest level of the type of agreement in PTAs in Asia is a free trade area. 26 Moving from no PTA or a preferential agreement to a free trade agreement increases trade by 26%., which indicates that 26 The type component codes preferential trade agreements as 0, so in the analysis they are treated the same as no PTA. We reran the regression with type recoded so that preferential agreements receive a score of .2 and free trade agreements a score of .4. The results do not change.
minimal agreements where countries liberalize trade only on some products do not have a large effect on trade while efforts to liberalize substantially all products do have an effect. 27 The other four components have similar or stronger effects on trade. PTAs with reciprocal reductions that are implemented within the same time frame by all parties result in a 25.4% increase in trade.
Agreements that cover more than 80% of industrial goods-the highest category of coverage of industrial goods-are associated with a 29.4% increase in trade. PTAs with provisions that cover more than 80 percent of agricultural goods-also the highest category of coverage for agricultural products--are associated with a 30.9% increase in trade. Finally, if non-tariff barriers are eliminated at the same pace or more quickly than tariffs and if no exclusions are allowed, trade increases by 30%.
The bottom half of Table 5 includes the Enforcement and Flexibility components. Results largely corroborate those for the aggregate measures. For Enforcement, the provision of a formal dispute settlement mechanism is the only statistically significant measure. Not surprisingly, the more formal the dispute settlement mechanism, the stronger the effect on trade. Moving from no dispute settlement mechanism to a formal dispute settlement mechanism increases trade by 25%, about the same effect as creating a free trade area. None of the three measures associated with impoing costs for violating the agreement have a significant effect. 28 This suggests that greater costs for violating an agreement are not necessary to increase trade. However, the costs do not 27 In results not shown, we include separate dummy variables for preferential agreements and for free trade agreements; the latter is statistically significant while the former is not. 28 In results not shown, we recoded the cost measures such that any mention of cost received a score of 1 and no mention received a score of 0. This change does not affect the results; the coefficients remain insignificant. Almost all PTAs coded have some value for at least one of the three cost components, so the dichotomous variable is very similar to the dichotomous PTA variable.
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have to be prohibitive. The Flexibility measures concerning dumping and escape clause invocation have positive but marginally significant effects on trade.
Overall, then, governments do not need to tie their hands too tightly when signing PTAs.
Giving up more trade policy discretion increases trade more than giving up less discretion. Trade also increases more if a government is given some latitude to violate the agreement than if a government is prevented from violating the agreement. Moreover, the costs that a government pays for violating the agreement do not have any effect on trade. That is, an agreement that imposes high costs for violating the agreement does not increase trade more than one that imposes low costs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that PTAs should not all be treated the same and that differences in their provisions have different effects on trade-creation. Some agreements are weaker than others in providing for the liberalization of trade, as they allow for trade-distorting measures or provide subjective dispute settlement mechanisms that frustrate trade. We construct an index of PTA provisions based on their legal texts and apply it to PTAs involving at least one Asian country. The wide variation in judicialization in trade agreements and other control variables such as economic size and development among countries in the region provide a very good testing ground for our argument, and we expect that these findings are generalizable to a larger sample that includes countries outside the region.
In our results, we find that a dichotomous measure of PTAs does not significantly affect 
Trade Policy Discretion
The indicators in this category focus on the depth of the PTA, or the range of products covered and whether standards other than trade are covered. For the products covered and the timetable of reductions, the more stringent reductions will be coded. 
